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PAL A. FREUND i
Anniversaries are a time for retrospect and prospect, looking into
the murky past and peering into the misty future. In 1889, to mark
the centennial of the Constitution, a celebration was held at the
University of Michigan. One of the speakers, Professor Charles A.
Kent, speaking on constitutional development since 1864, took a backward and forward look at the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.' Pointing out that a large number of cases had reached
the Supreme Court on this ground, he quoted the impatient remark
of Justice Miller in 1877, in Davidson v. New Orleans, that "the
docket of this court is crowded with cases in which we are asked to
hold that State courts and State legislatures have deprived their own
citizens of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," and
that "the clause under consideration is looked upon as a means of
bringing to the test of the decision of this court the abstract opinions
of every unsuccessful litigant in a State court of the justice of the
decision against him .

.

.,, 2

The speaker reviewed the efforts,

all of them futile, to induce the Supreme Court to set aside state laws
prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors and of oleomargarine, laws
* This Article was presented orally as the Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture,
delivered November 7, 1963, under the auspices of the Pennsylvania Chapter of the
Order of the Coif and the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
i Professor of Law, Harvard University. A.B. 1928, Washington University;

LL.B. 1931, S.J.D. 1932, Harvard University; LL.D. 1954, Columbia University,
1956, Washington University, University of Louisville, 1961, University of Chicago.
1 Kent, Constitutional Development in the United States, as Influenced by Decisions of the Supreme Court Since 1864, in MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY, CONSTITUTIONAL

HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AS SEEN IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERicAN LAW

(1889).
2 Id. at 231-32, quoting Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97; 104 (1877).
(631)
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fixing maximum rates and charges for railroads and storage elevators,
and laws dispensing with the petty jury or the grand jury in state
courts. The speaker concluded:
These and other decisions show that for the protection of all
the ordinary rights of life, liberty, and property, each individual must rely mainly on the constitution, statutes, and
judiciary of his own State, and that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of the United States can be successfully invoked, at present, only in extreme cases. Still, the jurisdiction exists in all this class of cases, and the time may come
when that court, with a changed membership and changed
tendencies, may set aside State laws deemed most important
for the proper administration of justice.'
Within a year of that address, the Supreme Court decided the
case of Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota,' holding that the due
process clause was violated by a state law making the findings of a
state commission conclusive on the subject of equal and reasonable
charges for railroad transportation. The case can be seen as one of
those bridge decisions that open up new terrain by connecting it with
familiar ground. The deprivation of property, it was insisted, must
be the result in the end of a judicial determination as a matter of due
procedure in the strict sense, and the judicial function must ultimately
include a decision on the reason of the law and the order. From that
decision, wrote Judge Hough in 1919, "I date the flood." '
At almost the same time as the Michigan celebration, the Harvard
Law School Association was awarding a prize for the best essay by a
member of the graduating class. The award went to Charles E.
Shattuck for his paper entitled "The True Meaning of the Term 'Liberty' in Those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions Which
Protect 'Life, Liberty, and Property.' "6 The prize-winning author
noted the tendency of state courts to give the term "liberty" a meaning
considerably broader than physical freedom of the person, and specifically to include the right to follow any ordinary calling. Setting himself against this latitude of meaning and protection, the author
concluded:
One is obliged to ask why it should include thus much and
no more. If it includes the right to pursue any lawful trade,
why should it not include the right to worship in any lawful
manner, to print or speak in any lawful manner, and to exerRId. at 233.
4134 U.S. 418 (1890).
5 Hough, Due Process of Law-To-day, 32 HAirv. L. REv. 218, 228 (1919).
6 4 HARv. L. REv. 365 (1891).
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cise one's political privileges in any lawful manner? Possibly, if the point should arise, it would be held to include all
the above liberties, although the writer hasnot found any
statements in the books to that effect. The reasons for supposing that the term should not be so interpreted have already
been set forth.'
Mr. Shattuck had to wait a little longer than Professor Kent to
find that his rhetorical question was not so rhetorical after all. Here
the progression was from property to proprietary liberties-liberty to
pursue a lawful calling, to make contracts, and to manage one's business-and so at length to liberty of the mind and in the forum of
ideas. The judicial bridgework was constructed of questions, of concessions for the sake of argument, and finally of solid holdings. The
story is familiar enough, but it may be worth recalling briefly at a time
when we are inclined to account liberties of the mind and forum as the
starting point and to ask in turn whether these may not imply parallel
liberties of a proprietary kind. In 1907, Justice Holmes could say, in
a case on contempt of a state court by a newspaper publication, "We
leave undecided the question whether there is to be found in the Fourteenth Amendment a prohibition similar to that in the First." 8 In
1922, answering a contention that a state law requiring employers to
give a letter to an employee upon discharge or termination of service
describing the cause of his leaving was an infringement of a right of
the corporation derived from the guarantee of freedom of speech, the
Court observed that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any
other provision of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon
the States any restrictions about 'freedom of speech' or the 'liberty of
silence'; nor, we may add, does it confer any right of privacy upon
either persons or corporations." ' Meanwhile, questions began to be
raised. In his dissenting opinion in Gilbert v. Minnesota, Justice
Brandeis concluded with a sharp confrontation: "I cannot believe that
the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes only
liberty to acquire and to enjoy property." 10 In Gitlow v. New York,
argued and reargued in 1923 and decided in 1925, Justice Holmes,
joined by Justice Brandeis, introduced his dissenting opinion with the
flat assertion:
The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be
taken to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view
of the scope that has been given to the word "liberty" as
7Id. at 392.
s Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).

9 Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Cheel, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922).
10 254 U.S. 325, 343 (1920).
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there used, although perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation than is allowed to
Congress by the sweeping language that governs or ought
to govern the laws of the United States.1 1
The majority in that case were impelled to make an assumption which
proved in the long run more significant than the decision: "For present
purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the
press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment
by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." 12
The rest of the story is well-known, and it is one in which Justice
Roberts played a significant role. The chief justiceship of Charles
Evans Hughes was the watershed. Beginning with Near v. Minnesota
in 1931,13 in which Justice Roberts was an indispensable member of
the majority of five, liberty of the press was firmly assimilated to the
other liberties that had received shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment. Freedom of religious belief and exercise was established in an
opinion by Justice Roberts himself in Cantwell v. Connecticut,"4 and
the foundation for liberty of association was laid in DeJonge v.
Oregon. 5 In the same period the guarantees in favor of defendants
in criminal cases were given new vitality, notably in the right to
counsel,' 6 the exclusion of coerced confessions,' and the scrutiny of
jury lists for evidence of racial discrimination; "8and the separate but
equal doctrine began to be eroded in decisions on state provision of
higher education. 9
All of this movement and ferment, so obscure to the vision of
1889, reflected a sensitivity to values that had emerged in the society
and that were sharpened by visible and powerful threats here and
abroad. It is no accident, after all, that during the tenure of Justice
Roberts, which coincided with the rise of totalitarian dictatorships, the
Court found occasion to set aside the action of Mayor Hague of Jersey
City in handpicking the speakers permitted to use the public square,
the action of a Huey Long-dominated legislature of Louisiana levying
"1268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925).
12 Id. at 666.
1'283 U.S. 697 (1931).
14 310 U.s. 296 (1940).
15 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
1' Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
17 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
18 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
19
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
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an oppressive tax on the big-city press, and the action of Governor
Sterling of Texas in declaring martial law in defiance of a federal
court order. 20
Today we are in the centennial year of the Emancipation Proclamation and are approaching the hundredth anniversary of the fourteenth amendment itself. For all of the warnings posted by the examples of anniversary prophecies, the temptation is nevertheless strong
to cast an eye on the vistas opened by recent developments. But before
venturing on that hazardous course, a few words ought to be said
about the process of deriving meaning from, or infusing meaning into,
the noble and spacious clauses of the amendment. I have said that the
process obscured to the vision of 1889 reflected a heightened sense of
values in the contemporary world. To say this is to raise the perennial
and nagging question of objectivity in constitutional law.
It is no disparagement of a work of art or of its interpreters that
it takes on new relevance, yields new insights, answers to new concerns, as the generations pass. Nor is it a reproach to a Constitution
"intended to endure for ages to come, and to meet the various crises
in human affairs" or to its interpreters that it too responds to changing
concerns of the society to which it ministers. As Hamlet has at one
time or another been seen as a story of revenge, a study of the borderland of sanity, a search for rational instead of spectral modes pf evidence, an analysis of mother-fixation or a death-wish, and as none of
these can be said to be wrong, each having some relevance and some
validity, so it need not be cause for despair that to one generation the
Constitution was primarily a means of cementing the Union, to another a safeguard of property, to another a shield of access to political
participation and equality before the law.
In a very recent essay, Professor Stuart Hughes has set out his
view of the problem of objectivity for the historian:
I remember that at one time I really believed that the writer
or teacher of history could and should attain to a sublime detachment. As the French put it, he should be above the
m~l~e of human events, delivering with sovereign confidence
the "verdict of posterity." Since then, an intense exposure
to the ideas of Benedetto Croce has cured me of such notions:
I have learned that the result of the historian's efforts to be
detached has usually been the very opposite of what anyone
would call great history. It has been bloodless history, with
no clear focus, arising from antiquarian curiosity rather than
from deep personal concern, and shot through with meta2
0Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1936) ; Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
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physical and moral assumptions that are all the more insidious
for being artfully concealed.
This does not mean that I-and others like me-have
learned from Croce to write partisan history with a good conscience. Far from it: we detest mere polemic, and we certainly know how to distinguish between fine historical writing
and writing designed to serve a cause. We recognize that
historians have been right in striving for serenity and the
world-embracing view. But we understand this aspiration in
rather a different sense from the way in which it used to be
taught to us. What we have learned from Croce and his like
is that "objectivity" is to be valued only if it is hard-wononly if it is the end result of a desperate and conscious battle
to rise above partisan passion. The man who does not feel
issues deeply cannot write great history about them. Unaware of his own prejudices, he cannot bring them to full
consciousness and thus transcend them, nor will his prose be
infused with that quality of tension and excitement that comes
from strong emotion just barely held under control. Only
after he has mastered his own limitations can the historian
begin to make constructive use of them. "Man's capacity to
rise above his social and historical situation," as Carr puts it,
"seems to be conditioned by the sensitivity with which he recognizes the extent of his involvement in it."

21

I venture to think that even Chief Justice Hughes, without making
allowance for grandfatherly pride, would have found that portrayal of
the historian's art to be a fair statement, mutatis mutandis, of the constitutional jurist's as well.
I wish to consider three recent developments in the law of the
fourteenth amendment: first, the extension of the idea of due process
in criminal cases; second, the new concept of equal protection in the
reapportionment cases; third, the expanding notion of state action or,
better, state responsibility. Obviously a rounded treatment of all these
thorny issues is not possible. What I shall try to explore is the extent
to which these developments open up straight, unclouded vistas or
disclose curtained patches of haze that may call for circunispection in
the judicial passage.

I.

DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL CASES

The extension of the idea of due process in criminal cases is symbolized by Mapp v. Ohio,22 ruling that the products of an unconstitu21 Hughes, Is Contemporary History Real History?, 32 tHE AmmucAx SciroLA1
516, 520 (1963).
2367
U.S. 643 (1961).
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tional search and seizure must be excluded from evidence in a state no
less than a federal criminal trial. This development was in fact foreseen by Justice Roberts, though with no enthusiasm. In his Holmes
lectures at Harvard in 1951, he pointed out that the concept of due
process was being extended by assumptions for the sake of argument:
"We are led to speculate when the Court will hold that the Fourteenth has absorbed the Fifth and Eighth Amendments" (compare the
evolution of the guarantees of speech), while the logical result of that
extension, the reversal of state convictions, was being withheld. It
was an uneasy compromise-"a strange medley," he called it, "of
federal and state law"-that could not, in his judgment, endure: 3
Now that the compromise has been abandoned and the exclusionary
rule of evidence made mandatory, will there be a reexamination of the
federal substantive rules of search and seizure themselves to determine
more precisely than was necessary heretofore just what rules may be
ascribed to the Constitution and what to the supervisory power over
the federal, as distinct from the state, courts? We have already seen
an equal division of the Court on this issue: whether the requirement
of self-identification of the officers at the door is indeed a constitutional command for all or only the better practice demanded of federal
officers.2 4 Since the common law did not impose an exclusionary consequence on illegal searches and seizures, an absolute equation of
common-law rules of conduct with the new demands of the fourteenth
amendment is, from a functional or operational point of view, a redefinition of the rules themselves. It does not require a tongue of nd
of constitu- /VV
prophecy to predict that some reexamination at the fringes
7 f'
that there may be some l'Vve
tional standards will be undertaken, and
latitude left for state variations.
A related problem is the temporal, rather than the territorial, reach °
of the Mapp case--the issue of retrospective application to prisoners uIT
seeking release or a new trial through habeas corpus. Since the new
,h
evidentiary-rule-goes-not-to._the intrinsic fairness of the trial but to an
hic
effective sanction for the enforcement of rules of police conduct, and
since that sanction will operate prospectively, the compulsion to apply
,
the exclusionary policy retrospectively is relatively weak; latitude here
too may well be left for local option. A more difficult question of
retrospective application is posed by the rule requiring the appointment
of counsel for indigent defendants in state cases involving serious
charges. The answer may well turn on a question of the relation of
23

ROBmTs,

THE

COURT AND THE CoNSTITUT ON

2 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).

87-89 (1951).
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the recent Gideon v. Wainwright decision 25 to the predecessor doctrine
deriving from the opinion of Justice Roberts in Betts v. Brady.26 In
overruling that case, did the Court mean to lay it down that a trial
without counsel is necessarily unfair, or only that the effort to apply
Betts v. Brady on a case-by-case basis, looking for aggregate unfairness
in the conviction under review, proved to be weariness of flesh and
spirit and ought to be superseded by a flat rule of judicial administration in the state courts, a rule, moreover, that experience with Betts v.
Brady might well have moved them to adopt for themselves in the
interim? Here the mode of opinion-writing in overruling is more than
a matter of style or manners; it has operative implications for an important class of cases. Perhaps the style of the Gideon opinion was
meant deliberately to foreclose this question in favor of a retrospective
command; but the Court has chosen not to say so, electing to put the
question in the first instance to a state court.
Whatever the outcome
may be, it would be regrettable if a supposed necessity to conform the
criteria on habeas corpus to evolving standards of judicial administration and review in criminal trials should in the future prove to be a
dogma reflexively inhibiting the Court in the evolution of those
standards themselves.
II.

EQUAL PROTECTION IN REAPPORTIONMENT CASES

If the reapportionment case 28 -- to turn to the new vista of equal
protection of the laws-was an extraordinary decision, it was a response to an extraordinary problem. The obstacles in the way of
federal judicial review were formidable. The standing of the complainants ought to be linked to their substantive rights as voters, and
since plainly they had no right to absolute fractional equality with
voters in every district, and since principles of representation have long
been a matter of diversity-resting on population, or area, or other
interests, or a combination of these-, a formulation of the complainants' legal rights may ultimately have to probe deep into the foundations
of political philosophy. Moreover, the problem of equity jurisdiction,
the shaping and enforcement of a decree, was no less formidable, given
the awkward solution of an election at large with no proportionality
through districting, and the risk of inaction or stalemate in the lawmaking branches of state government.
25 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
26316 U.S. 455 (1942).
27 Pickelseimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963); see Daegele v. Kansas, 375
U.S. 1, 89 (1963), remanded for consideration in light of Douglas v. California, 372

U.S. 353 (1963).
28 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

of democratic representation see
(1962).

For some of the complexities in a theory
TuuocH, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
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But the case before the Court was a particularly insistent one.
The state constitution itself had resolved the issue of the basis of
political representation in favor of the principle of numbers; the actual
apportionment was not the product of legislative policy but of legislative inaction for sixty years; and no popular procedure like the initiative and referendum, independent of the legislature, was available under
state law. It is sometimes said that when legislatures and executives
cannot be moved to advance the cause of liberalism, the opportunity
and responsibility devolve on the courts. Stated thus baldly, the counsel is surely a dangerous invitation, dangerous to the standing of the
Court and false to the liberalism in whose name it is propounded. But
in the context of the Tennessee apportionment case the default of the
lawmaking machinery had special relevance, for the very structure and
processes that are presupposed in representative government had become distorted.
The future will test the Court's resourcefulness in defining the
rational bounds of patterns of representation without resorting to a
simplistic criterion of one man, one vote-a criterion meaningful in an
election for a single state-wide office or for a particular representative
but question-begging in the case of a collegial body to be chosen with
a view to balanced representation. This is the kind of challenge that
even a John Marshall did not always succeed in meeting satisfactorily.
That the power to tax is the power to destroy-asserted in order to
strike down a state tax discriminating against the United States
Bank 2_, that the power over commerce among the states is exclusively lodged in Congress-asserted in order to set aside a stategranted monopoly 0-, these were doctrines going beyond the neces-

sities of the case or the problem, doctrines which plagued constitutional law for a long time, because they could not contain the counterpressures from state interests that had been slighted in the formulas.
The general direction of Marshall was characteristically wise, but the
momentum of doctrine shot beyond its mark, and other generations
were obliged to retrace some giant steps in order to follow a viable
course. The problem for the courts in reapportionment, I suggest, is
similar: to maintain direction while avoiding the confounding of the
rational with the doctrinaire.
III. THE EXPANDING NOTION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
The unfolding concept of state action, or state responsibility, has
made a strong appeal to those students of our society who see in the
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
30 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
29McCulloch v. Maryland, 18
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modern corporation, the labor union, and other forms of association a
microcosm of the state itself. In strength, in importance, in their
impact on their members and on the community, some at least of these
organizations do appear to rival and resemble formal governmental
units. What more natural, then, than that they should be "constitutionalized," subjected to the restraints which have been leveled by the
Constitution at government itself?
The decisions which have thus far brought certain "private" action
under the restrictions of the fourteenth amendment have taken us a
long way beyond a formalistic view of the responsibility which that
amendment attaches to deprivations by the "State." The Court has
shown a sense of realism in this development, but has so far declined
to take the step of unhinging the amendment from close state involvement, and to overrule the Civil Rights Cases. Where the state has
delegated certain governmental functions to private groups, the groups
are held to constitutional duties in carrying them out, as in the conduct
of party primaries, which are an integral part of the political electoral
process, 3' and the normally governmental conduct of a company-owned
town. " The latter case is of special interest because it concerns rights
of public assembly and religious exercise, illustrating the reach of the
amendment beyond acts of discrimination. Another class includes
cases where the state may fairly be held responsible for the private
conduct, by granting an exclusive or near-exclusive franchise, or by
providing special facilities to carry out the private plan. 3 A further
group includes cases where state-owned facilities are involved, through
lease or similar arrangement 3 The decision in Shelley v. Kraemer,"
holding unconstitutional the judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive housing covenant, is susceptible of various interpretations, but the
reiteration in the opinion of that there were a willing seller and a
willing buyer suggests that the state court was in those circumstances
regarded as the effective cause of the discrimination. Or the decision
may be rationalized by assimilating the enforcement of a neighborhood
covenant, binding on all successors in interest, to a municipal zoning
ordinance binding on all neighborhood property owners when a certain
majority of them have approved a racial restriction.
The further vista of an overruling of the Civil Rights Cases has
been opened to some eyes by the public-accommodations bill and the
31
32 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
33 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957);
Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); cf. Pennsylvania v. Board of
Directors
of City Trusts, 357 U.S. 570 (1958).
34
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).

35334 U.S. 1 (1948).

1964]

NEW VISTAS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

controversy over its more proper constitutional basis-the commerce
clause or the fourteenth amendment. The immediate purpose of the
fourteenth amendment was to validate the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
which was directed to acts under color of state law. When in 1875
Congress undertook to prohibit not acts under color of state law, but
discriminatory practices by public carriers, inns, and theatres, the statute was held to exceed the authority conferred by the amendment 3 6
When it is asked why the Civil Rights Cases have not been overruled, and what the prospects of overruling are, the best clue to an
answer lies in the cloudiness of the meaning of the question-"overruling" the decision. It is easy enough to state the principle on which
the cases were decided: that only acts for which the state is in some
meaningful way responsible are comprehended by the amendment. But
to state the principle that would underlie an overruling is far from
easy. The dissent of Justice Harlan is itself not wholly clear, but at
all events he did not take the position that all private action permitted
by state law could be reached by Congress because all such action is
philosophically a delegation of sovereign power. What would be involved is not simply an ad hoc determination, or an appeal to moral
sentiment, or a problem of choice between the slogan of property rights
and the slogan of public responsibility of public enterprises. Because
the fourteenth amendment is spacious in its guarantees and is cast
largely in terms of prohibitions that are self-executing (by way at least
of injunctive relief and defenses to legal claims, without enforcement
legislation), any decision "overruling" the Civil Rights Cases has
implications for judicial power and duty that transcend the immediate
controversy. Such a decision would have a momentum of principle
that might carry it far beyond the issue of racial discrimination or
public accommodations. The point is not that the step must therefore
be rejected; it is that if the step is taken, it should be done with clear
awareness of its larger implications. In this respect it differs qualitatively from a step taken under the commerce clause, for that is
primarily a grant of legislative power to Congress, which can be exercised in large or small measure, flexibly, pragmatically, tentatively,
progressively, while the recognition of guaranteed rights, if they are
declared to be conferred by the Constitution, is not to be granted or
withheld in fragments. Therefore, it is necessary to arrive at some
conception of the range of rights which an overruling of the Civil
Rights Cases would create for the courts and the Congress to enforce.
Equal protection and due process are the guarantees of the amendment which have been most intensively applied against official state
36 Civil Rights Cases,

109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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action. In considering their possible applications following an overruling of the Civil Rights Cases, three levels of questions are raised:
to what enterprises,to what activities of those enterprises, and by what
standards shall the applications be made?
If the extension were limited to public utilities in the strict sense,
those enterprises having a duty, under the common law or statutes of
the state which created them, to serve the public generally, there might
be no problem, for the state itself would be discriminating in its law if
its courts would enforce this duty on behalf of all except members of a
particular race or religion. But public utilities in this sense are a
narrow class of enterprises-public carriers and inns for lodging-,
and it would have to be shown (as it was not in the Civil Rights Cases)
that the state practiced discrimination in enforcement of the general
legal duty to serve imposed under its own law.
It has been suggested that a right be recognized against all establishments licensed by the state; the license would be the nexus between
state and private responsibility. Licensing varies in scope and function
from state to state, and from city to city. It may signify only that an
establishment has paid a tax, or satisfies sanitary or safety standards,
or is operated by qualified persons. To make the constitutional right
to be served turn on the presence or absence of a license would thus
produce some anomalous results, substituting a new formalism in the
movement away from an older one. Moreover, as a practical matter, a
local government would not find it difficult to dispense with the requirement of a license while retaining control over sanitary, safety, and
similar conditions as well as over tax liability. The standards imposed
on an establishment in these respects could be enforced by injunction
or civil and criminal penalties, without the device of a license.
There is one type of license which stands on a different footinga certificate of convenience and necessity, conferring a monopoly or
near-monopoly. When the state grants such a franchise, it forecloses
potential competitors from operating on a possibly nondiscriminatory
basis, and so in a special sense the state may be regarded as contributing to the discriminatory policy followed by its franchise holder.
This penumbra of the fourteenth amendment has already been recognized without legislation, in connection with the duties of a union
holding an exclusive bargaining position under law and a private bus
line holding a franchise."
If licensing by itself were regarded as a basis for application of
the fourteenth amendment, the question would arise whether private
37Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Boman v. Birmingham
Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
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schools and colleges licensed by a state, or lawyers, or indeed all corporations operating under state charter, could properly be omitted
from the coverage. Similarly, if licensing gives rise to constitutional
duties and corresponding rights, it is hard to see how any exemptions
could be made on the basis of size, any more than other constitutional
rights, like that of freedom from censorship, can be made to turn on
the size of an establishment.
An alternative basis for identifying certain enterprises with the
state for purposes of the fourteenth amendment is the concept of businesses affected with a public interest, a category that for many years
was used to signify those enterprises that could be subjected to state
control over prices and rates. But even for this permissive purpose,
the classification proved unsatisfactory and artificial, and when in 1934
this criterion was frankly abandoned by the Court in an opinion by
Justice Roberts, the decision was generally welcomed as clearing the
constitutional atmosphere." Mr. Justice Roberts said:
It is clear that there is no closed category of businesses affected with a public interest . . . . In several of the decisions of this court wherein the expressions "affected with a
public interest," and "clothed with a public use," have been
brought forward as the criteria of the validity of price control,
it has been admitted that they are not susceptible of definition
and form an unsatisfactory test of the constitutionality of
legislation directed at business practices or prices.3 9
If agreement were reached on a definition of establishments subject to the fourteenth amendment, the further question would be faced
of the activities or practices that are encompassed. Is discrimination in
employment included equally with discrimination in service? If one is
covered and the other is not, is Congress or the Court restricting
thereby the bounds of constitutional guarantees, since injunctive remedies would normally be open even apart from statute to restrain threatened infringements of constitutional rights? Since the amendment
relates to many practices besides discrimination, since indeed it now
absorbs the basic guarantees of the Bill of Rights, questions will arise
over the applicability of these to the establishments that are assimilated
to the state: whether, for example, such an establishment could make
preferential contributions to a church, and whether its intracorporate
procedures must satisfy standards of due process of law.
If the private licensee takes on to some extent the constitutional
duties of the public licensor, there is the further problem of the stand3s Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
39 Id. at 536.
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ards for defining those duties. If an official licensor gave preference
to the sons of licensees, a serious issue would be raised under the equalprotection clause. ° If the licensee himself followed a policy of nepotism
in his business, would a similar constitutional issue be raised? In all
likelihood a new set of constitutional standards would have to be formulated for private practices covered by the amendment-a set conforming neither to the legal-ethical codes for purely private conduct
nor to the constitutional code for governments and their agencies.
The combination of these uncertainties-the class of establishments, the kinds of practices, and the standards to be set-may well
account for the Court's adherence to the basic principle of the Civil
Rights Cases. It is not a matter of lack of sympathy for the moral
claims asserted; the real problem is an institutional one, whether at
the national level those claims are to be vindicated, in private relations,
through processes of legislation under a congeries of powers (commerce, defense, spending), or whether they are to open up new areas
of direct constitutional relationships which will call for judicial creativity and innovation on a formidable scale.
It is ironic that some of the sentiment in Congress for a publicaccommodations bill based on the fourteenth amendment rather than
the commerce clause has come from legislators who are concerned
that the commerce clause is too expansive and would put business to
the hazard of too pervasive national regulation, while the fourteenth
amendment is thought to be the safe and natural vehicle for the securing
of Negro rights. It is an ironic tribute to the incantation of slogans.
IV. CONCLUSION

I have said enough to make it plain that the new vistas in constitutional law are not, in my judgment, boundless, that they are not
free of shadows and even treacherous turns. What I am saying is
perhaps simply, as others have been saying, that there are no absolutes
in constitutional law.
But I would wish to dissociate myself from those who instance the
recent prayer decisions " as a yielding to absolutes. In the result the
decisions do not, as is often loosely asserted, ban prayer and Biblereading from the public schools. They ban prescribed public prayer
and devotional Bible-reading-a rather different thing. The difference between such prayer and a period of meditation during which
each student may recite silently what his spirit or training prompts
40 Kotch v. Board of Pilot Conm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale,
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370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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is a considerable constitutional difference but hardly a drastic one in
practice; to regard it as drastic in principle is to exalt the words of the
mouth over the meditations of the heart in a way repugnant to the
great religious traditions and to exalt official conformity over religious
voluntarism in a way offensive to the American political tradition.
Not only in result but in legal foundation as well the prayer
decisions hardly deserve to be condemned as absolutist. They would
so deserve if they were based on a supposed principle forbidding any
and all public aid to religion. Such a principle would presumably prohibit the use of public parks for religious causes (assuming them to be
available for secular causes), to say nothing of chaplains in the armed
services, military exemption for conscientious objectors, statutory dispensation from Sunday laws for sabbatarians, and a host of other
legislative supports given on account of religion. Obviously any
sweeping proscription would raise a painful dilemma when the claims
of free exercise were met by so absolute a conception of establishment.
But in the prayer cases the two guarantees, so far from colliding, supplement each other. In saying this, I put more central emphasis than the
opinions did on the special circumstance of the psychological coercion
on children toward conformity in the atmosphere of a schoolroom, and
the consequent pressure on freedom of religious conscience-in sharper
terms, the official pressure to yield to what is worship for most and
may be idolatry for some. If it be suggested that this argument ignores
the right of free exercise by the majority, or that it will be time enough
to ban the ceremonies when they reach the stage of sectarian worship
(meanwhile affording the nonconformists the privilege of nonparticipation, as in the flag-salute case), the answer is the same: that to vest
school boards and courts with the task of drawing lines between sectarian and nonsectarian forms of a concededly religious activity would
only compound the objection by vesting essentially theological disputes
in secular hands and so impinging on the nonestablishment guarantee.
The problem resembles that in the Miracle case,' where in order to
escape from the vagueness of the criterion of "sacrilege" as a standard
for censorship it would be necessary to vest in secular agencies the
role of defining this theological concept and thus to become impaled on
the horn of establishment. If an escape from absolutism is usually to
be found in recognizing and sharpening differences of degree, that
course is hardly open when it entails a decision from among competing
theological positions.
I have likened the Constitution to a work of art in its capacity to
respond through interpretation to changing needs, concerns, and aspira42Joseph

Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
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tions. In a larger sense all law resembles art, for the mission of each
is to impose a measure of order on the disorder of experience without
stifling the underlying diversity, spontaneity, and disarray. New
vistas open in art as in law. In neither discipline will the craftsman
succeed unless he sees that proportion and balance are essential, that
order and disorder are both virtues when held in a proper tension.
The new vistas give a false light unless there are cross-lights. There
are, I am afraid, no absolutes in law or art except intelligence.

